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 Abstract  
Our thoughts are certainly about things(objects), however, what kind of 
things(object) are our thoughts directed at? What is the relationship 
between mental objects and external world object? What is the nature 
and character of mental and extra mental objects? An attempt at 
answering these meta-epistemological questions, brought to light the 
ideas of Franz Brentano on ‘Intentionality’ and Alexius Meinong’s 
Theory of object. Through proper method of philosophical analysis, it 
was discovered that both philosophers agreed that intentionality is a 
unique character exhibited by the human mind. However, Meinong went 
further to develop a more comprehensive object theory which attempts 
at clarifying some of the ontological difficulties associated with 
Brentano’s notion on intentionality. The research concluded that, 
though, both philosophers had areas of divergence and convergence in 
their respective epistemological thoughts, but insisted that the influence 
of Brentano’s ideas on Meinong cannot be overemphasized, which is to 
say, Meinong’s object theory, could be said to be a reaction towards the 
problem of referential opacity present in Brentano’s account of 
Intentionality. 
Introduction 
Meinong's theory of object and Brentano's concept of intentionality (the mind's potential to be 
concerned with anything) deal with the ontological nature and character of conceivable things 
(mind). Assumptions and inferences, according to Alexius Meinong, are complex objects 
known as goals. They're made of other things, according to Meinong. We can imagine and 
imagine things that don't exist by utilising the things we've seen in the actual world. Golden-
Mountain and Centaur are only two examples of the many combinations that may be made with 
these two elements. Meinong argues that an item may be an object of thought in any situation, 
such as when someone thinks about the fact that Otukpo is located in Benue. 
A person's intentions are not visible to others; hence Brentano  (1995) believes that intent is a 
mental rather than physical condition. Love and caring may be shown via body language, but 
the full meaning of such sentiments is only known to those who have access to the person's 
thoughts and feelings. Suppose a five-year-old boy is carrying a glass cup to his father, and he 
drops it. The cup breaks, and the boy's father has to pick it up. There is no doubt that the goal 
was noble, but the consequences are disastrous. Brentano's account of ontological concerns in 
intentionality helps us understand Meinong's theory of Objects. It is Meinong's belief that 
intentional interactions are always the result of a mental act and an object, rather than the 
immanent content idea. In certain situations, the intended object does not exist in the physical 
world; but, an object that is compatible with the mental act toward which they are meant does. 
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Literature Review 
An Exposition of Alexius Meinong’s Object Theory 
Meinong defines the goal of a mental act as anything that may be experienced in some way as 
a consequence of the mental act itself. An object cannot be discussed without bringing into 
account mental activity, which is defined as "object" (1888-1903). Meinong does not describe 
an object as something that can be seized, but rather as something that can be grasped by mental 
processes that can be represented, to mention a few instances, since the term "object" does not 
reflect an ontological reliance, but rather a conceptual dependency. He accepts that 
"everything" and "object" are linked in this way. Regardless of the fact that everything is a 
physical object, everything is pre-given to the mind in order to be grasped. 
In Meinong's view of things, no matter how impossible a thing is or how "defective" it is, it is 
included (the thought about itself, for example). Similar to Twardowski, Meinong asserts the 
existence of non-beings does not need a discussion of nothingness. An objectless representation 
or notion, on the other hand, is impossible. For the contradictory statement "there are things of 
which it is true that there are no such objects," we must find a way to resolve it. First, he defines 
"there are" as "outside being" (pre-giveness). Second, he alludes to two closely linked 
principles: (1) independence of so-being and (2) the pure object's indifference to so-being. 
Meinong, (Meinong, 1981) stated: The next year (Meinong, 1981). 
The independence principle, first defined by Ernst Mally in 1903, states that "the so-being of 
an item is not influenced by its non-being," which indicates that an object's having properties 
are unaffected by whether or not it exists. This principle includes Meinong's claim that any 
object has the properties that it is characterized as having (e.g. "the AB is A and B'), and the 
denial of the ontological assumption, which holds that there are no true propositions about what 
does not have being (e.g., "the AB is A and B, respectively") ( Routley, 1982). 
Even if one of the object's two beings or non-beings occurs in every scenario, the object is 
inherently indifferent to being according to the indifference principle (Meinong,1981). "The 
pure object stands 'beyond being and non-being,'" as opposed to this terminology, is meant to 
be more clear. The latter word suggests that an item's nature does not include either being or 
non-being (it is so being, but it should not be interpreted to imply that an object is beyond being 
and non-being in the sense that it neither has being nor does not have being). In the second 
statement of the indifference principle, there is no ambiguity. It is possible that the non-
existence of an object is guaranteed by the object's nature, but this does not hold true for all 
objects. Law of excluded middle states that every object must be either a reality of being or 
non-being at any given time (Findlay, 1963). While it is important to keep in mind that there 
are two meanings of the term "negativity," it is also important to keep in mind that there are 
two versions of the law of excluded middle (narrower, predicate, or ontological negation and 
larger, external, sentence logical negation). Only in the case of sentence negation objects does 
Meinong accept the rule of excluded middle. There is a difference between reading a book and 
fantasizing about a fictional character like Sherlock Holmes, for example. 
That is the point of my representation, how Meinong sees things. It's not clear what Meinong 
is talking about. The introduction of this item may seem to be problematic, and it may even 
appear to contradict prior remarks by Meinong. First, "the object of my representation" seems 
to be something that cannot either represent an object in the extra-mental world, or a fact about 
that item. The idea that knowledge is based on an object's agreement with itself would be absurd 
if this were the case. Second, "the object of my representation" cannot be the same as the 
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predicable things from its qualities, such as the feature of being quadrangular, since the content 
is mentally. 
Types of Object 
Meinong divides objects into three categories based on their ontological status. Objects may 
exist in either one of three states: being, not-being, or neither. The concept of "existence" or 
"real actuality" may be used to describe an object's physical and temporal existence. When we 
use the word "subsistence," we indicate the object's unchanging existence in the long run. The 
condition of being a thing without having any existence is referred to as absistence or being-
given. 
Some things, like mountains and birds, are possible in theory, while others, like numbers and 
theorems, are just not (numbers, theorems, and so on). Things that cannot be created, such as 
impossible objects, fall into a third category altogether (e.g square circle, wooden iron etc.) In 
order to be considered a "minimum" person, you must know that you have received anything. 
To be "given," on the other hand, is merely to receive something. As J.N. Findlay put it, "being-
given," or "absistence," is better understood as a sort of non-being rather than as a manner of 
being in and of itself. Because nothing exists, everything has a negative connotation, unlike the 
ideas of existence and sustenance. Despite the fact that some subset of the whole number of 
possible things exists, only a tiny fraction of them are really real.) In light of the conclusion 
that nothing exists, Meinong may deal with our ability to declare the non-existence of a specific 
object. This is shown by our determination to continue doing so, which exists logically before 
our denial of its existence. 
Object and Subject 
As you can see, Meinong divides the world into four distinct divisions. (1) "Object" (Objekt), 
which may be real (as in horses) or ideal (as in a human being); (like the concepts of 
differences, identity, etc.). the affirmation of being (Sein) or non-being (Nitchsein), of a 
particular kind of being (such as Sosein), or of a certain kind of thing with which it is associated 
(Mitsein), are examples of "objective" judgments. What philosophers call "states of affairs" are 
intimately tied to objectives (which may or may not be real, "obtainable," or otherwise). 
Examples include the truth, the good, and the beautiful, all of which are "dignitative." Desirable 
things like responsibilities, objectives, and so forth. 
Mental activity fall into four categories: Representation (das Vorsetellen) for objects, Thoughts 
and Feeling (das Fuhlen) for dignitaries and desiderative, and Representation (das Vorsetellen) 
for desiderative. 
An Exposition of Brentano’s Concept on Intentionality 
A new area of psychology, "the study of mental processes," was Brentano's principal goal in 
life (Brentano,1995). He provides a more detailed account of mental happenings as part of the 
discipline's quest to complete this definition. According to Brentano (1995), there are six ways 
to discriminate between mental and physical things: First, and first, mental phenomena are the 
exclusive focus of inner perception. Second, mental phenomena are also the sole focus of 
exterior perception. Third, mental phenomena are also the sole focus of outside perception. 
They always seem to be one and the same. They are usually focused towards a specific item or 
collection of items. Psychological phenomena and only those based on presentations or 
presentations must also meet the following three conditions: they seem to have no spatial 
expansion; they must not only have genuine existence, but they must also lack purposeful 
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Mental events have one thing in common: "that they can only be experienced in one's own 
consciousness; while physical occurrences can only be observed externally" (Brentano,1995). 
According to Brentano, it is the first of these two forms of perception that provides 
unambiguous evidence for what is true. "Wahrnehmung," which means "taking-true" in 
German, is the only sort of perception that exists in a formal sense, according to Brentano. 
Because the latter implies that one is engaged in a mental act—the act of observing—directed 
toward another mental act (the action viewed), the phrases "inner perception" and "inner 
observation" should not be used interchangeably. Inner perception, on the other hand, should 
not be seen as a background activity to other mental activities. Every mental act is accidentally 
oriented towards itself as a secondary object as a consequence of its main direction, which is 
linked with the former. As an example, when I gaze at a tree, my visual experience is focused 
on the tree, not the surrounding landscape. Nonetheless, I am also aware of the fact that I am 
having a mental experience that is directed toward the tree. Consequently, I am aware of the 
fact that I am seeing the tree rather than hearing or feeling it. Consequently, my visual 
experience is not just focused on the tree, but also on me as a secondary object. 
Brentano is most recognized for introducing the notion of intentionality into contemporary 
philosophy. A famous articulation of the intentionality thesis may be found in these first 
sentences from his writings: To use the Scholastic terminology, "all mental occurrence is 
defined by the intentional(or mental) inexistence of an object and by what we could name, 
though not fully explicitly, reference to a content, orientation toward an object" The author 
claims that 'every mental phenomenon includes something as an object inside itself' One of 
Brentano's goals is to give one of six criteria for separating mental from physical experiences, 
rather than to develop a comprehensive explanation of intentionality as a consequence of his 
study. 
On the other hand, the purposeful object of our attention is a part of the psychological act. The 
problem stems from a mental rather than a physical one. Brentano seems to have advocated a 
kind of immanentism, in which the purposeful aim is "in the mind," rather than "out there." It 
is claimed that Brentano distinguishes between intentional correlate and object, and that the 
existence of the latter does not depend on our orientation toward it. As a result of this lack of 
clarity, Brentano's pupils frequently challenged his idea of intentionality when they used it to 
build more systematic accounts. If the intended object is part of the act, we are confronted with 
a duplicate of the object, it was said. 
This kind of behavior is often targeted towards a mental and purposeful objective in addition 
to a tangible, real-world object that is experienced, remembered or thought about. My thoughts 
on the city of Abuja are essentially about a mental object that is part of my act of thinking, 
rather than the actual city itself. As a result, there are a number of issues, the most important 
of which is the inability to steer two individuals toward the same goal. We must first explain 
how it is possible to have mental experiences that are directed towards non-existent entities 
such as Hamlet, the golden mountain, or a round square if we assume that the targeted object 
and the actual object are equal. Like my ideas about Abuja, these actions likewise have an aim 
in mind, but the difference is that their objectives don't exist in the same way that my thoughts 
about Abuja exist. 
Mental events are orientated toward themselves as secondary objects, according to Brentano's 
theory. In this approach, inner perception is a technique through which we become conscious 
of our mental experiences (David, 1968). Thus, Brentano rejects the idea of unconscious mental 
acts: because every mental act is incidentally directed toward itself as a secondary object, we 
are instantly aware of every mental act that happens. It is possible for people to participate in 
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with which the object, or the secondary object (the act itself), is shown is equal to the intensity 
with which it is presented. Our inner knowledge of the act, or our "secondary consciousness," 
will also be very low intensity if we participate in a mental act of low intensity, he claims.... 
According to Brentano, it is common for humans to describe an experience as "unconscious" 
even if it was really a low-intensity conscious mental event. 
To put it another way, Brentano's consciousness is constantly united. Mental phenomena, 
unlike physical phenomena, can only be seen one at a time, despite the fact that we may be able 
to witness a variety of physical occurrences simultaneously. To use Brentano's language, when 
we seem to be involved in more than one mental act at the same time, such as when we are 
listening to a tune while drinking a glass of red wine and looking out the window, various 
mental phenomena combine into a single instant. Despite the fact that one of the elements has 
been eliminated, such as when I drink the wine and look away from the fire, the collective will 
continue to exist in its present shape. We can't do two distinct mental acts at the same time or 
anticipate future mental acts because of the unity of consciousness. This means that inner 
observation is a non-starter since it would need us to perform two distinct mental acts, one of 
which is aimed at the other, at the same time. 
A Critical Analysis of Meinong’s Object Theory in Relation to Brentano’s Intentionality 
For Meinong, an answer to Brentano's ontological concerns with his concept of Intentionality 
is possible in the fullest sense. Meinong maintains that the intentional link is always a relation 
between the mental act and the object, rather than a future content (Chisholm1982).. The 
intentional object may not exist in all situations, but even in these scenarios, there is some 
object outside of the mental act that we are directed towards. In Meinong's view, even things 
that don't exist might be called genuine. In order for us to focus our attention on them, they 
must exist (bestehen). Circular squares, for example, are theoretically impossible to exist, and 
hence cannot exist at all (Meinong 1981). To build Husserl's theory of consciousness, the 
notion of intentionality was critical in Husserl's phenomenological work. In contrast, Husserl 
uses the concept of "noema," which he defines as the intentional correlate of the act, to resolve 
the problem of directedness. 
The similarities Between Meinong’s Object theory and Brentano’s thought on 
intentionality 
This idea of intentionality is a form of cognition on a certain topic that is used by both of them. 
On the basis of Meinong's view, it is aboutness and attention to objects that are the most 
essential qualities of mental states. According to him, the "content" of an experience is what 
distinguishes one from another in terms of meaning. As a result, Brentano is credited for 
reinvigorating the concept of intentionality in contemporary philosophy. For him, 
"intentionality" is simply "aboutness," which he defines as the relationship between mental 
operations and the external world. As a result, he considered it to be the most significant feature 
of mental processes. Psychological acts have a certain goal in mind, and each one has a specific 
purpose (the intentional object) (Rollinger, 1993). All beliefs and desires have an object: the 
item that the believer or desirer believes in or desires. 
Some external objects, like as mountains and birds, exist according to Meinong, but he denies 
that ideas and emotions exist ( square-circle, wooden-iron etc) Meinong believes that certain 
things exist in the actual world, while others don't exist in the truest sense of the term. The 
concept of "internal inexistence" was also coined by Brentano to characterize the mental 
condition in which a thought object exists only in one's own mind and awareness. When it 
comes to the distinction between psychological and physical phenomena, Brentano said that 





ISSN 2721-0960 (Print), ISSN 2721-0847 (online) 
Copyright © 2021, Journal La Sociale, Under the license CC BY-SA 4.0  
enable intentional relationships in the second place. Psychological events are distinguished 
from physical occurrences by their ability to have an intentional object, he argues (Dölling 
2017). We can see from the beginning that Meinong studied under Brentano, and it is because 
of this that Meinong has taken the position to write about his object theory, which is based on 
the foundation of his studies as a student of Brentano. On the other hand, Meinong was 
influenced by Brentano's ideas on the concept of purpose. 
Areas of Divergence 
Emotions may be divided into two categories: feeling (Gefuhle) and desire (Gefuhle). This is 
Meinong's first deviation (Begehrungen). In his second alteration, he introduces a contrast 
between serious (ernstartige) and fantastical (phantasieartige) experiences (which he refers to 
as "assumptions") experiences. There are three components to mental phenomena, according 
to him: the act, content, and object. Humans may be guided to the same thing in different ways, 
i.e., via different kinds of mental activity; thus he advocates for acceptable non-real (ideal) 
objects that correspond to mental actions of evaluation, emotion, and desire. 
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